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RESUMEN
Una de las particularidades de las ciudades de Renania durante la Edad 
Media fue su propensión a formar ligas (Städtebünde) por iniciativa propia, 
en ausencia de una autoridad central fuerte imperial. Dichas alianzas 
significaban notables colaboraciones diplomáticas entre rivales económicos 
con el fin de resolver conflictos y mantener la “paz del rey” (Landfriede) 
cuando el monarca era incapaz de hacerlo. La inclusión de esas ligas urbanas 
regionales e interregionales ha comenzado recientemente en la historiografía 
de lengua alemana sobre la historia urbana europea, pero su ausencia sigue 
siendo profunda en la de lengua inglesa y otras historiografías occidentales. 
Este artículo trata de paliar dicha ausencia historiográfica. Tras ubicar el 
tema en su contexto historiográfico moderno, se estudian las dos grandes 
ligas urbanas renanas (1245-1247 y 1381-1389), proporcionando un 
marco más amplio para una consideración más atenta de la alianza urbana 
renana liderada por Colonia en 1301-1320, dirigida contra los arzobispos 
y electores del príncipe de Colonia, Maguncia y Tréveris. La sofisticación 
de las colaboraciones administrativas, financieras, diplomáticas, militares y 
comunicativas entre las ciudades renanas en este período es extraordinaria 
y merece ser incluida en el relato de la resolución de conflictos, la cultura 
política y el gobierno territorial de la Europa bajomedieval. 
Palabras clave: Alemania; Renania; Colonia; Historia urbana; 
Historiografía; Diplomacia medieval.
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ABSTRACT
One of the distinctives of Rhineland cities of the central and later Middle 
Ages is their propensity to form leagues (Städtebünde) on their own initiative 
in the absence of strong imperial central authority. These alliances represent 
remarkable diplomatic collaborations between otherwise economic rivals in 
order to resolve conflicts and sustain the “king’s peace” (Landfriede) when 
the monarch was incapable of doing so. The inclusion of these regional and 
interregional Rhenish urban leagues into the historiography of European 
urban history has only recently begun in German-language medieval 
scholarship, yet it remains profound in its absence among Anglophone or 
any other western historiography on medieval urban history. This article 
seeks to address such an historiographical absence by introducing the 
subject within the context of this volume’s comparative, European-wide 
focus on medieval institutional structures, conflicts, and political culture. 
After situating the subject in its modern historiographical context, the 
two great Rhenish urban leagues (1254-1257 and 1381-1389) are studied, 
providing a further framing context for a close consideration of the Cologne-
led Rhineland urban alliance of 1301-1320 directed against the elector-
prince archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier. The sophistication of 
administrative, diplomatic, financial, military, and communication organs 
among the Rhenish cities in this period is extraordinary and thus provides 
additional insight into central and later medieval European political 
culture, conflict resolution, and territorial government. Medieval urban 
history thereby extends its landscape from that within the city walls to the 
pathways of diplomatic discourse between them. 
Keywords: Germany, Rhineland, Cologne, Urban History, Historiography, 
Medieval Diplomacy.
There is perhaps no more powerful and lasting image of the medieval city 
than its defensive walls. From municipal seals to modern monographs, 
cities and towns often appear as anachronistic islands in a sea of feudal 
jurisdictions, isolated immunities experimenting with forms of self-
governance and commercial activity. Yet medieval German towns and cities 
actively formed networks of solidarity and mutual aid, even as early as 
the thirteenth century. Unfortunately, the slim nineteenth-century German-
language historiography on this activity was written by nationalist-liberal 
academics who framed such networking as a quintessential bourgeois battle 
for national unity against the fragmenting forces of aristocracy and the 
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Catholic Church. Constitutional and legal scholars of the twentieth century 
produced an only slightly larger body of scholarship that characterized 
these alliances as vehicles for legal reform and juridical legitimation of 
bourgeois society, while Marxist historians saw them as the locus of social 
conflict between the forces of the bourgeoisie and feudalism. So in fact it is 
only in the past decade or so that German-language urban historians have 
studied these alliances and produced a more nuanced understanding of their 
functions within an urban landscape of networks.1 The recent completion of 
a long-term editing project on documents related to the Rhineland alliances 
has also provided a welcome impetus for deeper investigations into the 
inner workings of these urban coalitions.2 
Perusal of non-German historiography on medieval German cities indicates 
that, apart from the Hanseatic League, the integration of medieval German 
urban alliances into wider European urban history has only just begun, though 
this literature leaves the impression that such urban alliances began only at 
the close of the medieval period.3 As capacious an observer as Susan Reynolds 
1 KIEβLING, ROLF, «Städtebünde und Städtelandschaften im oberdeutschen Raum: 
Ostschwaben und Altbayern im Vergleich», in ESCHER, MONIKA, ALFRED 
HAVERKAMP and FRANK G. HIRSCHMANN, Städtelandschaft – Städtenetz – 
zentralörtliches Gefüge. Ansätze und Befunde zur Geschichte der Städte im hohen und 
späten Mittelalter, Trier 2000, pp. 79–116; DILCHER, GERHARD, «Mittelalterliche 
Stadtkommune, Städtebünde und Staatsbildung. Ein Vergleich Oberitalien-
Deutschland», in LÜCK, HEINER AND BERND SCHILDT, Recht – Idee – Geschichte. 
Beiträge zur Rechts- und Ideengeschichte für Rolf Lieberwirth anläßlich seines 80. 
Geburtstages, Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2000, pp. 453-467; HOLGER, TH. GRÄF 
VON and KATRIN KELLER, Städtelandschaft - Réseau urbain - Urban Network. Städte im 
regionalen Kontext in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 
2004; KREUTZ, BERNHARD, Städtebünde und Städtenetz am Mittelrhein im 13. und 14. 
Jahrhundert, Trier 2005; BÖNNEN, GEROLD, «Der Rheinische Bund von 1254/56: 
Voraussetzungen, Wirkungsweise, Nachleben», in: FELTEN, FRANZ J., Städtebünde 
- Städtetage im Wandel der Geschichte, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 13-35; DISTLER, EVA-
MARIE, Städtebünde im deutschen Spätmittelalter. Eine rechtshistorische Untersuchung 
zu Begriff, Verfassung und Funktion, Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 207, 
Frankfurt am Main, 2006; THON, ALEXANDER, «Städte gegen Burgen. Tatsächliche 
und mutmaβliche Belagerungen von Burgen am Mittelrhein durch den Rheinischen 
Bund 1254-1257» Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte 34 (2008), pp. 17-42. 
2 RUSER, KONRAD, Die Urkunden und Akten der oberdeutschen Städtebünde vom 13. 
Jahrhundert bis 1549, Göttingen 1979-2005, 3 vols. For historiographical surveys of 
this field of research see KREUTZ, Städtebünde und Städtenetz am Mittelrhein im 13. 
und 14. Jahrhundert, pp. 18-30 and DISTLER, Städtebünde im deutschen Mittelalter, 
pp. 15-36. DISTLER also provides a complete bibliography of all published German-
language scholarship on the subject of the urban leagues of the central and later 
Middle Ages.
3 BUCHHOLZER-RÉMY, LAURENCE, Une ville en ses réseaux: Nuremberg à la fin du 
Moyen Âge, Paris, 2006, BUCHHOLZER-RÉMY, LAURENCE and OLIVIER RICHARD, 
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only mentioned pre-Hanseatic urban leagues in passing as mere precursors of 
the Hansa, though the two urban movements do not share the same pedigree 
-- neither in organization, purpose, nor outcomes.4 The traditional emphasis 
on urban development of burgher autonomy, legal status, administrative and 
commercial skill, self-government and civic life during the central and later 
Middle Ages within the city walls has ironically obscured our awareness that 
these developments also functioned collectively beyond and between those 
walls. And once we add the dimension of inter-city collaboration, the central 
and later medieval history of cities and towns begins to share some of the 
contours of centralized governance, state-like administrative organs, and 
diplomacy once thought to be the preserve of territorial lords and monarchs. 
Networks of extra-territorial solidarity and mutual aid were not the sole 
domain of the aristocracy, nor was the development of a political culture 
of diplomacy, communication, fiscal planning, and military organization. 
German urban polities were also developing these aspects of their own socio-
economic, political, and cultural history during the central and later Middle 
Ages. Thus any study of medieval German institutional structures and 
political culture is incomplete without the inclusion of these regional and 
trans-regional urban alliance networks. Such integration is just beginning 
to take place in Germanophone historiography, but medieval Rhineland 
urban alliance networks still remain virtually unknown in other national 
historiographies.5 
Though central and later medieval German cities achieved significant 
jurisdictional and economic immunities for their citizens within the confines 
eds. Ligues urbaines et espace à la fin du Moyen Âge - Städtebünde und Raum in Spätmit-
telalter, Strasbourg, 2012, and FORSÉN, BJÖRN, «Was there a south-west German 
city-state culture?», in HANSEN, MOGENS HERMAN, A comparative study of six 
city-state cultures: an investigation, Viborg, 2002, pp. 91-106. The urban alliances of 
medieval Germany are nowhere to be found in such standard Anglophone surveys of 
medieval urban history as NICHOLS, DAVID, Urban Europe, 1100-1700, New York, 
2003 and LILLEY, KEITH D., Urban life in the Middle Ages 1000-1450, New York, 
2002. 
4 REYNOLDS, SUSAN, Kingdoms and communities in Western Europe 900-1300, 2nd 
ed., Oxford, 1997, p. 175. German scholars include the Hanseatic League in general 
overviews of various types urban collaboration, (see SCHMIEDER, FELICITAS, Die 
mittelalterlicher Stadt, 2nd edition, Darmstadt, 2009, pp. 138-139; HIRSCHMAN, 
Frank G., Die Stadt im Mittelalter, Munich 2009, pp.40-41), while scholars of 
the Rhenish and Swabian leagues rightly treat it as a special exception given 
its overwhelmingly commercial nature (See DISTLER, Städtebünde im deutschen 
Spätmittelalter, pp. 53-68).
5 WATTS, JOHN, The making of polities: Europe 1300-1500, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 101-
105 does mention the German urban alliances in his discussion of European com-
munes and sworn associations.
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of the city walls, conversely they had limited power to control the wider 
environment beyond the walls on behalf of these citizens. This was especially 
so given the aristocratic and princely territorial lordships (Fürstenstaaten) being 
consolidated in the Rhineland region in the later Middle Ages. The citizens 
of Cologne, for example, had achieved autonomy by driving their archbishop 
permanently from the city at the Battle of Worringen in 1288,6 yet the city 
itself was still geographically enveloped by the archbishop’s territorial principality 
(Kurfürstentum Köln or Kurköln) and he was only as far away as his palaces in 
Bonn and Brühl. In essence, all medieval German cities faced the same obvious 
problem: while their citizens were increasingly mobile they themselves were 
immobile organizations by nature, which required creative strategies to provide 
security for their people, goods, and capital when in transit. Since all urban 
magistrates dealt with this same problem, solidarity between them quickly proved 
to be a common good.7 And thus urban alliance networks emerged in Germany 
from the early thirteenth century. Our focus here shall be on the Rhineland 
cities and particularly on Cologne, though significant and long-lived urban 
leagues emerged as well in Swabia and the Alsace,8 the Lake Constance region,9 
6 SCHÄFKE, WERNER, Worringen 1288. Historische Entscheidung im europäischen 
Nordwesten, Cologne, 1988; SCHÄFKE, WERNER, Der Name der Freiheit 1288-
1988. Aspekte Kölner Geschichte von Worringen bis heute, Cologne, 1988; JANNSEN, 
WILHEM and HUGO STEHKÄMPER, Der Tag bei Worringen, 5. June 1288, Cologne 
and Vienna, 1988; TORUNSKY, VERA, Worringen 1288: Ursachen und Folgen einer 
Schlacht, Cologne, 1988. 
7 GROTEN, MANFRED, Die deutsche Stadt im Mittelalter, Stuttgart, 2013, p. 170. 
8 SCHULER, PETER-JOHANNES, «Die Rolle der schwäbischen und elsässischen 
Städtebünde in den Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Ludwig dem Bayern und Karl 
IV.», Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte 114 (1978), pp. 659-694; VOGLER, B., «Die 
Elsässische Dekapolis (1354–1679)»,” in KIRCHGÄSSNER, BENHARD, and HANS-
PETER BECHT, Vom Städtebund zum Zweckverband, Sigmaringen, 1994, pp. 21-28; 
SITTLER, LUCIEN, «Der elsässische Zehnstädtebund, seine geschichtliche Eigenheit 
und seine Organisation», Esslinger Studien 10 (1964), pp. 59-77; VISCHER, WILHELM, 
«Zur Geschichte des schwäbischen Städtebundes der Jahre 1376–1389», Forschungen 
zur deutschen Geschichte 2 (1862), pp. 1-202, and 3 (1863), pp. 1-39; BLEZINGER, 
HARRO, Der Schwäbische Städtebund in den Jahren 1438–1445 mit einem Überblick 
über seine Entwicklung seit 1389, Stuttgart, 1954; SCHILDHAUER, JOHANNES, «Der 
Swäbische Städtebund -- Ausdruck der Kraftentfaltung des deutschen Bürgertums in 
der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts», Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus 1 
(1977) 187-210.
9 FÜCHTNER, JÖRG, Die Bündnisse der Bodenseestädte bis zum Jahre 1390: Ein Beitrag 
zur Geschichte des Einungswesens, der Landfriedenswahrung und der Rechtsstellung der 
Reichsstädte, Göttingen, 1970.
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Saxony,10 Wetterau (Hesse),11 Thuringia,12 and Upper Lusatia.13 
THE RHENISH LEAGUE (RHEINISCHER BUND) 1254-1257
Unlike the Italian city-states of the Lombard League, German cities like 
Cologne did not possess their own territorial state (contado),14 though several 
of the northwestern imperial and free cities associated with the Hanseatic 
League did purchase some villages and rural mortgage revenues in the 
surrounding countryside as investments.15 Nonetheless, describing any 
medieval German city as a city-state does not comport well with the German 
Empire’s constitutional structure.16 Rather, with Cologne, Nuremberg, 
and Augsburg chief among them, the major German cities preferred to 
exercise influence over their respective hinterlands through commercial 
and manufacturing clout rather than to compete with local and regional 
10 MENDTHAL, H., Die Städtebünde und Landfrieden in Westfalen bis zum Jahre 1371. 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Landfrieden in Deutschland, Könisgsberg, 1879; BERNS, 
JÜRGEN KARL W., Propter communem utilitatem. Studien zur Bündnispolitik der 
westfälischen Städte im Spätmittelalter, Düsseldorf 1991; WINTERFELD, LUISE VON, 
Die Kurrrheinischen Bündnisse bis zum Jahre 1386, Göttingen, 1912; WINTERFELD, 
LOUISE VON, «Gottesfrieden und deutsche Stadtverfassung», Hansische 
Geschichtsblätter 23 (1927), pp. 8-56; WINTERFELD, LOUISE VON, «Westfalen in 
dem groβen Rheinischen Bund von 1254», Westfälische Zeitschrift 93 (1937), pp. 128-
142; PFEIFFER, GERHARD, «Die Bündnis- und Landfriedenspolitik der Territorien 
zwischen Weser und Rhein im späten Mittelalter», in AUBIN, HERMANN and FRANZ 
PETRI, Der Raum Westfalen, Munster, 1955, II: pp. 79-140; HENN, VOLKER, «‘. . . umb 
Orbar, nutticheit, Raste vnd Vrede onser und anderer stede,’ Zur Bundnispolitik der 
westfälischen Städte im späten 14. und im 15th Jahrhundert», Westfälische Zeitschrift 
145 (1995), pp. 9-28; SAATKAMP, FRIEDRICH, Ladbergen. Aus der Geschichte des 1000 
jährigen westfälischen Dorfes, 2nd edition, Ladbergen, 1975, pp. 313–315.
11 WERNER, HEINRICH, «Zur Geschichte der Wetterauer Städtebünde im 13. und 14. 
Jahrhundert», in: Mitteilungen des Oberrheinischen Geschichtsvereins 7 (1898), pp. 56-76.
12 MÄGDEFRAU, WERNER, Der Thüringer Städtebund im Mittelalter, Weimar, 1977; 3rd 
edition: Thüringen im Mittelalter: Städte und Städebünde, Bad Langensalza, 2010.
13 CZOK, KARL, «Der Oberlausitzer Sechsstädtebund zwischen Bürgergeist, Königs- 
und Adelsherrschaft», in: 650 Jahre Oberlausitzer Sechsstädtebund 1346–1996. Ka-
menz, 1997, pp. 9-16; DURAND, MANFRED, Die Oberlausitz und der Sechsstädtebund, 
Waltersdorf, 1991.
14 EPSTEIN, STEPHEN R., «The rise and fall of Italian city-states», in HANSEN, 
MOGENS HERMAN, A comparative study of thirty city-state cultures: an investigation, 
Viborg, 2000, pp. 277-294.
15 Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Erfurt were leaders in this policy: BEHR, HANS-
JOACHIM, «Die Landgebietspolitik norwestdeutscher Hansestädte», Hansische Ge-
schichtsblätter 94 (1976), pp. 17-37.
16 JOHANEK, PETER, «Imperial and free towns of the Holy Roman Empire: city-states 
in pre-modern Germany?», in HANSEN, A comparative study of thirty city-state cul-
tures: an investigation, pp. 297-298. 
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aristocrats for territorial aggrandizement.17 Nevertheless, conflicts with 
the local nobility and regional princes proved to be a primary impetus for 
Rhenish urban alliances.
In the same year that the second Lombard League organized against 
Emperor Frederick II (1226), the urban governments of three Rhenish 
cathedral cities, Mainz, Worms, Speyer, joined Bingen and the Wetterau 
imperial cities of Frankfurt am Main, Gelnhausen, and Friedberg to form 
a seven-city league, the first multilateral urban alliance north of the Alps. 
This sworn association of mutual aid was directed against the elector-prince, 
Archbishop Siegfried II of Mainz. The recent depredations of the Staufen-
Welf dynastic war had weighed heavily on this region, whose territorial 
sovereignty had been handed to the ecclesiastical elector-princes by Frederick 
II in 1220 (Confoederatio cum principibus ecclesiasticis) in exchange for their 
votes for his son Henry (VII) as royal successor. Archbishop Siegfried had 
been awarded for his abandonment of the Welf cause and coronation of 
Frederick as king not only in Mainz (1212) but also in Aachen (1215). In the 
subsequent years, therefore, Siegfried had been busy enforcing his territorial 
sovereignty over these cities of the middle Rhine, and they finally responded 
not unlike the Lombard league.18 
We know next to nothing about this first alliance, as no charters or 
chronicle accounts survive, though it is striking that it incorporated cities 
under different territorial lordships. This type of urban collaboration surely 
displeased the emperor amid his arduous Lombard campaign, and so Frederick 
II had his son Henry (VII) dutifully announced at a Würzburg Diet (27 
November 1226) that all ministerials, dependents, and citizens under the 
legal jurisdiction of the archbishop of Mainz were to return to him from 
their refuge in Oppenheim, and the «confederationes sive iuramenta» whereby 
the seven cities had bound themselves together were to be dissolved.19 That 
17 EIDEN, HERBERT and FRANZ IRSIGLER, «Environs and hinterland: Cologne and 
Nuremberg in the later middle ages», in GALLOWAY, JAMES A., Trade, urban hinter-
lands and market integration c. 1300-1600, London, 2000, 43-57; IRSIGLER, FRANZ, 
«Stadt und Umland im Spätmittelater: Zur zentralitätsfördernden Kraft von Fernhan-
del und Exportgewerbe», in MEYNEN, E., Zentralität als Problem der mittelalterlichen 
Stadtgeschichtsforschung, Cologne and Vienna, 1979, pp. 1-14. Using the criterion of 
regional economic hegemony, SCOTT, TOM, The city-state in Europe, 1000-1600, Ox-
ford, 2012, p. 230 elects to define Cologne and Augsburg as commercial rather than 
territorial city-states, “islands of capital without a dependent territory.” 
18 DILCHER, «Mittelalterliche Stadtkommune, Städtebünde und Staatsbildung. Ein Ver-
gleich Oberitalien-Deutschland», pp. 453-467.
19 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 207; WEILAND, LUDWIG, MGH Constitutiones 
et acta publica imperatorum et regum (1198-1272), Hanover, 1896, reprint 1963, no. 294.
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this imperial ban on regional sworn urban associations was repeated and 
extended throughout the German kingdom at the Worms Diet (April/May 
1231) in the Statutum in favorem principum (in which Frederick II granted 
territorial sovereignty to the secular princes), and then repeated once again the 
following year at the Christmas Diet in Ravenna (at the request or the bishop 
of Worms), indicates that the urban communal movement was as respectful 
of ultramontane imperial authority as the German princes themselves. This 
core group of middle Rhine cities in 1226 was only the front edge of the wave.
The imperial ban on multilateral urban leagues led to a period of multiple 
bilateral friendship treaties for mutual protection, which gradually evolved 
into a return to multilateral associations by the mid-thirteenth century. 
Indeed, by 1250 the movement had spread from the middle Rhine to Saxony, 
Burgundy, and the upper Rhine.20 And these regional alliances in turn united 
during the next round of civil war at the end of the Staufen dynasty, producing 
what has become known as the Rhenish League (Rheinischer Bund).
Pope Innocent IV’s deposition of Frederick II at the Council of Lyon (17 
July 1245) released all German princes and nobles from their oaths of loyalty 
to the emperor, and the last phase of Staufen rule began. Electoral princes of 
the papal party, the Rhineland archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier chief 
among them, elected Landgrave Henry Raspe of Thuringia in 1246 and upon 
his unexpected death in 1247 Count William of Holland as anti-king to the 
Staufen imperial heir, Conrad IV. The resulting warfare between the two factions 
particularly threatened the middle Rhineland cities as the traditional heartland 
of Staufen power, but was also an opportunity for these cities to advance their 
own independence through collective, trans-municipal institutions.21 So these 
20 In 1229 seven cities in the bishopric of Liège formed a mutual aid union; in 1230 
Hamburg and Lübeck did the same (renewing the agreement in 1241); in the former 
Rectorship of Burgundy several Swiss cities began to form alliances from 1239 
onward; the first Saxon alliances appear in 1246 and 1252, while the first Westphalian 
urban alliances appear in 1246 and 1253. BOCK, ERNST, «Landfriedenseinigungen 
und Städtebünde ab Oberrhein bis zur Gründung des rheinischen Städtebundes von 
1381», Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, Neue Folge 46 (1933), pp. 321-372.
21 The end of Staufen rule was surely the close of the founding era in Rhenish urban history, 
but it was also the start of a new one in which the foundational institutions of burgher 
independence and self-rule in each city and town (e.g. communal consciousness, civic 
associations, city councils and administrative offices) now produced diplomatic and 
military alliances between their communities. Knut Schulz, «Stadtgemeinde, Rat und 
Rheinischer Städtebund. Das vorläufige Ergebnis des Prozesses der Kommunalisierung 
und Urbanisierung um 1250», in FREITAG, WERNER, FRANZ IRSIGLER, PETER 
JOHANEK, et. al., eds., Bünde - Städte - Gemeinden. Bilanz und Perspektiven der 
vergleichenden Landes- und Stadtgeschichte [Städteforschung, Darstellungen 77], 
Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2009, pp. 17-39.
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cities actively collaborated in a remarkable project of interregional diplomacy 
to form a massive self-help organization. It is most remarkable that the Rhenish 
League would garner such wide support among members that (a) were not 
all originally loyal to the same king, and (b) were making public sworn oaths 
expressly forbidden in the repeated bans on sworn urban associations. 
In February 1254 the cities of Mainz and Worms were the first to initiate 
a peace and reconciliation movement by putting aside their recent enmity 
and renewing their original alliance,22 which Oppenheim joined on 4 April 
and Bingen on 29 May.23 Thus territorial peace was established first through 
bilateral and then multilateral sworn pledges of peace between cities. From 
this original four-city peace alliance ensued a rapid expansion in membership 
that is hard to fathom. According to the Worms Chronicle, within two weeks 
after the death of Conrad IV (21 May 1254) representatives from sixty 
Rhenish cities met at a great council in Mainz to form a league «according 
to the example of Worms, Mainz, and Oppenheim» to provide mutual 
assistance for the next ten years against highwaymen, aristocratic violence, 
unjust tolls, and taxes, and «because there was no other help or solace 
available». Together they agreed to set aside all tolls on the Rhine near their 
cities, even though they held great debt because of the civil war. They further 
promised to destroy all fortifications of robber barons, and afterward sent 
emissaries to the following noblemen to invite them to join this association 
of «holy peace»: the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier; the bishops 
of Worms, Strasbourg, Basel and Metz; eight regional barons, and even more 
cities. The chronicler concluded, «Although at first unwilling, nevertheless 
they followed the others, came together at Mainz and swore together on the 
ten-year peace».24 Over the summer and autumn months the city of Cologne 
also joined this movement along with several other key Rhineland cities from 
Aachen to Zürich.25 The participation of Rhineland princes was critical to the 
league, not only because of their leadership roles in the civil war but also 
because of their regalian authority over tolls. The regional barons were also 
key to stabilizing local violence and robbery so prevalent on the byways of 
the Rhineland.
22 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 172.
23 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, nos. 173-174.
24 ZORN, FRIEDRICH, Wormser Chronik, Stuttgart, 1857, pp. 101-102; RUSER, Die 
Urkunden und Akten, I, p. 201, no. 213; WEILAND, MGH Constitutiones (1198-1272), 
no. 428/1; ROTH, PAUL, Der Rheinische Bund von 1254, Basel, 1954.
25 Additional cities listed are Neuβ, Wesel, Boppard, Wetzlar, Speyer, Strasbourg, 
Schlettstadt, Zürich, Freiburg im Breisgau, Breisach, Weissenburg, Neustadt, Wimpfen, 
Mühlhausen, Gelnhausen. 
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The core of this remarkable movement drew from the Peace of God 
(Gottesfrieden) and Truce of God movements of the eleventh century.26 In fact, 
the collective authors of a letter patent issued to all Christians to announce 
their 13 July 1254 Mainz agreement -- being listed explicitly as the civic 
leaders and citizens of Mainz, Worms, Cologne, Speyer, Strasbourg, and Basel 
-- described their organization as a peace league (Friedensbund).27 The letter 
not only contained the proactive steps taken to rein in violence and injustice, 
it also delineated specific arrangements for mediators (Schiedsleute) assigned 
to restore peace and reconciliation should the peace be broken internally by 
feuds among their members.28 These Rhenish burghers acted audaciously 
when initiating their own interregional peace, because declarations and 
maintenance of a public peace or truce had been the responsibility and 
authoritative right of the German monarch since Emperor Henry III issued 
a blanket peace over the entire kingdom in 1043, which was followed by 
the imperial peace (Landfriede) established by Emperor Henry IV in 1103 
as the First Mainz Imperial Peace.29 Though an imperial peace (Landfriede) 
had already been issued at Mainz in 1235,30 material conditions and imperial 
authority had been debased with the collapse of the Staufen dynasty to the 
point that city officials felt justified as public authorities to initiate resistance 
against those breaking the peace, «because there was no other help or solace 
available».31 The founding cities of the Rhenish League resided in the heart 
of Staufen territory, so they experienced most directly the warfare between 
pro- and anti-Staufen armies, and once Conrad IV died there was no Staufer 
to restore the hoped-for peace. Thus self-help was the only option at hand. 
It is typical in German constitutional history to point out the distinction 
made by territorial princes between the emperor and the empire by the later 
Middle Ages, yet here too we find Rhenish burghers capable of making this 
26 SCHMIEDER, Die mittelalterliche Stadt, p. 137.
27 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 209: «Iudices et consules et universi cives 
Mogonitineses, Colonienses, Wormacienses, Spyrenses, Argentinenses, Basilienses ac 
alie civitates sancte pacis federe coniurate omnibus Christi fidelibus salutem in eo, 
qui auctor est pacis et principium salutis.» 
28 Each city selected four representatives to a mediation board which would seek to 
reconcile disputing parties.
29 ARNOLD, BENJAMIN, German knighthood, 1050-1300, Oxford, 1985, p. 16; WATTS, 
The making of polities: Europe 1300-1500, pp. 101-102. 
30 GERNHUBER, JOACHIM, Die Landfriedensbewegung in Deutschland bis zum Mainzer 
Reichslandfrieden von 1235, Röhrsheid and Bonn, 1952.
31 BUSCHMANN, ARNO, «Der Rheinische Bund von 1254-1257. Landfriede, Städte, 
Fürsten und Reichsverfassung im 13. Jahrhundert», in HELMUT MAURER, Kommu-
nale Bündnisse Oberitaliens und Oberdeutschlands im Vergleich, Sigmaringen, 1987, pp. 
167-212.
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distinction and acting on behalf of the empire in the absence of an effective 
emperor.
The Rhenish League moved quickly to recognize William of Holland 
as the legitimate German king, who in turn provided royal sanction for 
the league’s existence. Cologne was formally taken into the association on 
6 October 1254 at the League’s Diet in Worms,32 though there is internal 
evidence that Cologne’s civic elites worried about expensive entanglements 
in rather distant disputes. Yet the city’s popular enthusiasm for joining this 
peace movement was given strong voice in the city council, the civic officials 
(scabini) acceded to this pressure and released a joint public letter with the 
city council (a rare thing indeed) announcing membership on 14 January 
1255.33 
Diplomacy with William of Holland had resulted in rapid and positive 
results, and on 6 February 1255 he was formally acknowledged as rightful 
king at the imperial diet in Worms and in turn he promised his personal 
protection of the Rhenish League.34 The Rhenish League cities had been 
invited to this imperial diet and thus sent their representatives. The 
highpoint of the League movement occurred at its own diet in Oppenheim 
in November 1255, where William of Holland appeared to personally 
sanction this sworn urban association -- a significant change in imperial 
policy from previous Staufen decrees. The Rhenish League was from this 
point an organization with imperially sanctioned legal standing and thus 
potentially an instrument of imperial policy for the preservation of both 
32 The Rhenish League’s self confidence in matters moral, political, and religious is quite 
striking, as we see in the document issued at the Worms Diet: WEINRICH, Lorenz, 
ed., Quellen zur Verfassungsgeschichte des römisch-deutschen Reiches im Spätmittelalter 
(1250-1500) [Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters 33], 
Darmstadt, 1983, pp. 14-16: «Ad honorem dei et sancte matris ecclesie necnon sacri 
imperii, cui nunc preest serenissimus dominus noster Willhelmus Romanorum rex, 
et ad communem utilitatem equaliter divitibus et pauperibus.» The Rhenish League 
also made clear in this document the essential purpose of their association: «pro pace 
servanda».
33 Within a month the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne and the bishops of Worms 
and Basel made public announcement of their official sworn membership in the 
Rhenish League, then the judges, lay assessors, and city councilmen of Cologne is-
sued their own public letter (14 January 1255), which also declared their loyalty to 
William of Holland. The king is mentioned no doubt because Cologne had already 
joined the Landfriede announced by William at Antwerp: Cologne City Archive, HUA 
K/196; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, p. 206, no. 222 and pp. 206-207, no. 223; 
WEILAND, MGH Constitutiones (1198-1272), nos. 429-430. See also GROTEN, MAN-
FRED, «Köln und der Rheinische Städtebund 1254», in ROSEN, WOLFGANG and LARS 
WIRTLER, Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln, Cologne, 1999, pp. 169-171.
34 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 226. 
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the imperial constitution as well as of the peace. And what is more, the 
Rhenish League had become a participant in the shaping of imperial politics. 
By November of 1255 the noble members of the Rhenish League were joined 
by many additional princes and barons -- including Countess Adelheid of 
Leiningen and the abbot of Fulda -- as well as additional cities.35 Cologne 
played a leading role in the Rhenish League, inviting the cities of Westphalia 
to join with the cities of the Rhineland and the Netherlands and it was soon 
considered one of the four capital cities of the League along with Mainz, 
Worms, and Strasbourg. Each year these four cities hosted in turn one the 
quarterly diets of the League representatives, Cologne’s date being the feast 
day of the Epiphany.36 As Cologne’s city councilmen took the lead in League 
affairs, both as document signatories as well as representatives to the quarterly 
diets, they gained valuable experience in administration and diplomacy apart 
from the hitherto dominant social group of scabini which had resisted the 
inclusion of the city council in civic governance. The fact that the city council 
was now recognized beyond the city walls as a valid and representative 
organ of Cologne’s civic administration was a critical step in establishing the 
permanence and leadership of the council within Cologne itself.37
At its height the Rhenish League had swollen to over sixty cities and 
more than thirty nobles great and small, including the bishop of Würzburg 
and the cities of Nuremberg and Regensburg. Surely this peace association 
had extended well beyond the boundaries of its title, and become a veritable 
general peace (Landfriede) in much of the German Empire. During the League 
diets in Mainz (March 1256)38 and Würzburg (August 1265), representatives 
35 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 255; WEILAND, MGH Constitutiones (1198-
1272), no. 428/6. 
36 This date (6 January) was appropriate for Cologne, in whose cathedral church lay the 
relics of the Three Kings (Magi) in a golden reliquary. Of the three other quarterly 
diets, Mainz hosted on the week after Easter, Worms on 29 June, and Strasbourg on 8 
September, all feast days of their respective patron saints. See DISTLER, Städtebünde 
im deutschen Spätmittelalter, p. 139.
37 GROTEN, MANFRED, Köln im 13. Jahrhundert, Cologne, 1998, pp. 164-166; DIS-
TLER, Städtebünde im deutschen Spätmittelalter, pp. 216-217.
38 The growing self-confi dence and sense of purpose among Rhenish League mem-
bers is reflected in the preamble to the 17 March 1256 charter issued by the Mainz 
Diet: WEINRICH, Lorenz, ed., Quellen zur Verfassungsgeschichte des römisch-deutschen 
Reiches im Spätmittelalter (1250-1500) 36: «Universis Christi fidelibus [. . . ] nuncii ci-
vitatum congregati Moguncie in colloquio generali salutem et obsequium. Ad laudem 
et gloriam Jesu Christi, qui est pacis auctor et humane salutis amator, ad honorem 
eciam sancte Romane ecclesie matris nostre, que pacem et iusticiam amplexatur, pro 
reverencia quoque imperii, cuius rigore iudicii incorribiles ad viam rectitudinis redu-
cuntur, ad salutem eciam pauperum ac tocius populi christiani.»
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continued to build for a future of peace and conflict resolution: they reached 
agreements in principle on the banning of usury, feuds, and non-resident 
citizens (Pfalbürger), the protection of farmers from coercion, taxation, 
and requisitioning, unified legal procedures for arbitration, regular league 
assemblies, a tax to fund the League, and even the building of a League navy 
and assembly hall (a domus pacis, reminding all of the religious mandate to 
be peacemakers and reconcilers). Though given the membership of princes 
and nobles in the League it cannot be properly called solely an urban league, 
nonetheless the majority of the planning, coordinating, and corresponding 
(both by written documents as well as embassies) were performed by burghers 
from a remarkably wide array of locations throughout the German Empire. 
Yet all this said, only rudimentary changes, such as an end to abusive 
aristocratic tolls, could be brought to full fruition before the Rhenish League 
collapsed as suddenly as it had been formed. Just as the League was given 
life with the death of Conrad IV in May of 1254, so too its own life span 
was cut short with the sudden death of William of Holland in 28 January 
1256. Indeed the 1256 diets at Mainz and Würzburg, which garnered so 
much diplomatic success, functioned in the shadow of the king’s death its 
portent of future disunity. The burgher members as well as the barons of 
the League could only hope that the imperial elector princes would prove 
as unified in electing a new king as they had been in preserving the peace. 
However, though the princes were present at the Mainz diet in March of 
1256, they abandoned them thereafter. The Rhenish League then began to 
slowly disintegrate throughout 1257, as members from the lower Rhineland 
followed their commercial interests in England and joined the electors who 
chose Richard of Cornwall, while those of the middle and upper Rhineland 
aligned with the electors who chose Alfonso of Castile.39 Initially hesitant to 
join the Rhenish League, the aristocracy became irritated by the denial of 
citizenship status (Pfalbürger) in the cities of their territories and even more 
perturbed by the burghers’ efforts to interfere in their rural affairs with the 
peasantry. The princes and barons never had significant influence within the 
league, and their stark absence from the diets in 1256 further widened the 
divide between nobility and cities just as the royal election process degraded 
into dispute and conflict. At best de iure adjunct partners in the Rhenish 
39 HUFFMAN, JOSEPH P., The social politics of medieval diplomacy: Anglo-German rela-
tions (1066-1307), Ann Arbor, 2000, pp. 277-300; HUFFMAN, JOSEPH P., «Mitravit 
me et ego coronabo. The archbishop of Cologne and Richard of Cornwall: an interre-
gional perspective on regnum and sacerdotium», in VAN DEUSEN, NANCY, Medieval 
Germany: associations and delineations, Ottawa, 2000, pp. 71-92. 
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League, the princes and barons could be a stabilizing or a destabilizing force 
depending upon whether or not a confluence of interests with the burghers 
remained. The primary interest was a commonly recognized king, like William 
of Holland, but this confluence flowed into regional associations as another 
round of weak and distant anti-kings enabled the princes to continue carving 
out territorial principalities of their own. The Rhenish League had declared 
at its March and August 1256 diets that no members should acknowledge a 
royal candidate in the case of a double election, in order to keep the peace 
(indeed the League was even to impound imperial property and income in 
such circumstances), and it planned to send representatives to the royal 
election to plead for a unified decision. For the sake of sustaining their 
peace movement, the Rhenish League members had even begun to speak on 
behalf of the empire after the death of its monarch.40 Unfortunately for the 
Rhineland cities this experiment in collaborative interregional diplomacy 
eroded in the face of aristocratic factionalism. No formal dissolution of the 
League ever occurred.
Though the Rhenish League did not survive the test of yet another 
disputed royal election in 1257, primarily because its constituent cities had 
not yet developed enough independent political and military strength to 
function on par with the German aristocracy, it was still no small or fleeting 
matter. This peace association was quickly developing into a powerful polity 
in the medieval German constitution. In a time of weak monarchy, the 
League’s cities proactively established an increasingly independent institution 
with both political influence and military success. The Rhenish cities thereby 
fashioned out of their original regional self-help peace association a centralized 
authority for preserving the interregional imperial peace (Landfriede), which 
had traditionally been the preserve of the monarchy. Commercial interests 
certainly factored in here, but remarkably the Rhenish League focused 
more on advancing the religious ideals of legal and social justice for the 
oppressed and of peacemaking through dispute mediation. Furthermore, the 
League actively pursued these ideals through pragmatic administrative and 
diplomatic means, indicating that the burgher elites throughout the reach of 
the League had achieved a new level of self-confidence and administrative 
expertise. 
Abbot Hermann of Niederaltaich acknowledged as much in his assessment 
of the Rhenish League, «That peace, however, begun in the manner of the 
40 WEINRICH, Lorenz, ed., Quellen zur Verfassungsgeschichte des römisch-deutschen 
Reiches im Spätmittelalter (1250-1500) pp. 40-41.
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Lombard cities, did not last long because of malicious resistance.»41 Hermann 
noticed the Rhenish League’s assertion of its own communal authority 
to organize and function as a peace-keeping institution vacante imperio. 
Though this interregional league dissolved after 1257 into a heterogeneous 
collection of regional alliances in the middle and upper Rhineland, in the 
Wetterau, and in Westphalia based on traditional allegiances and interests, it 
still continued to serve as the template for regional urban peace associations 
throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages.42 With many more generations 
of political experience than the burghers, the aristocracy fared no better than 
the Rhenish League in avoiding a disputed royal election and its consequent 
warfare. We cannot hold the League accountable for its inability to shape 
the royal election as it had no such constitutional authority. The outcome of 
the disputed 1257 elections lay squarely at the feet of the electoral princes 
and their factions. And though the burghers of the Rhenish League cities 
found themselves in time divided by the royal election, they had collectively 
claimed their place in the political culture of thirteenth-century Germany.43
THE RHENISH URBAN LEAGUE (RHEINISCHER STÄDTEBUND) 1381-1389
The Golden Bull issued by Emperor Charles IV in 1356 laid the 
constitutional foundation for future royal elections by further elevating 
the seven elector princes (among whom were the Rhenish archbishops of 
Cologne, Mainz, and Trier) with privileges in exchange for an end to double 
elections, as four votes of the seven electors now secured a majority-based 
election. But the Golden Bull also sought to empower the Rhenish elector 
41 PERTZ, GEORGE HEINRICH, Hermanni Altahensis Annales, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica Scriptores 17, Hanover, 1861, p. 397: “Ista autem pax, more Lombardicarum 
civitatum incoata, propter maliciam resistencium non diu duravit.”
42 From 1257-1381 numerous bi- and multilateral regional alliances formed and reformed 
in the lower, middle, and upper Rhineland, in Swabia, the Alsace, the Wetterau, 
Westphalia, Saxony, Thuringia, Upper Lusatia, and Brandenburg, often involving 
dozens of cities in the multilateral leagues. See for example, SCHILP, THOMAS, 
«Westfälische Städte und Rheinischer Bund: Überlegungen zur städischen Autonomie 
in der Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts», in FREITAG, WERNER, FRANZ IRSIGLER, 
PETER JOHANEK, et. al., eds., Bünde - Städte - Gemeinden. Bilanz und Perspektiven 
der vergleichenden Landes- und Stadtgeschichte [Städteforschung, Darstellungen 77], 
Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2009, pp. 41-61.
43 Knut Schulz, «Stadtgemeinde, Rat und Rheinischer Städtebunde», p. 39 concludes 
enthusiastically, “But let us not impose any inappropriate expectations on the Hansa 
as well as on the Rhenish Urban League in hindsight, but rather let us admire their 
achievements and their magnitude for such a short time period from their conception!” 
(translation mine). Schulz rightly places the Rhenish League on par with the more often 
recognized Hanseatic League as a signal achievement in medieval European urban history. 
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princes further by (once again) banning any «coniurationes, confederationes, 
et conspirationes» among the cities of the German kingdom, a move designed 
to weaken cities and their leagues relative to the imperial princes and local 
barons. A century of regional urban associations sanctioned under King 
William of Holland’s 1255 decree was now challenged by imperial authority. 
Yet the German monarchs knew the value of cities as a counterbalance to 
the power of the princes, and Charles IV in particular knew that this decree, 
itself a tacit admission of the now longstanding and widespread nature of 
regional urban sworn associations, was problematic in reality.44
The Golden Bull, however, did not secure peace in the German kingdom. 
Only a quarter century after its issuance the deteriorating political conditions 
in the Rhineland produced a second great interregional urban peace 
movement. The constant military conflicts between the archbishopric of 
Mainz and the Count Palatine of the Rhine, coupled with the outbreak of the 
Great Schism in 1378 and the formation of associations by local barons in 
southern Germany (Ritterbünde) in 1379, pushed the Rhenish cities beyond 
their now century-long regional alliances and back to experimenting with an 
interregional alliance structure. Yet this second great league was not like the 
first: over the intervening century medieval German cities had grown in their 
capacity for diplomatic and military organization as well the maintenance 
of their economic infrastructure. Therefore they proved to be a much more 
potent political force than in 1254-1257, and went to war this time not so 
much as a peace association than as a military league. 
On 20 March 1381 the cities of Mainz, Worms, Speyer, Frankfurt, Strasbourg, 
Hagenau and Wissembourg formed an urban alliance to last until Christmas 
1384.45 This military alliance now known as the Rhenish Urban League 
(Rheinischer Städtebund) was renewed in 1382 and again in 1392, all the while 
adding Wetzlar, Friedberg, Gelnhausen, Pfeddersheim, Selz, Oberehnheim, and 
Schlettstadt. Its organization was more sophisticated than the original Rhenish 
League, with subdivisions given their own capitals: the middle Rhine at Mainz, 
the upper Rhine at Strasbourg, and the Wetterau at Frankfurt am Main. Speyer 
for its part provided the location for the league’s regular diets. And each city was 
assigned specific troop contingents for any given campaign. The league even 
took a position on the Papal Schism, siding with Pope Urban VI in Rome.46 
44 GROTEN, Köln im 13. Jahrhundert, p. 240.
45 ENNEN, EDITH, «Rheinischer Städtebund von 1381», in ERLER, A., Handwörterbuch 
zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte IV, Berlin, 1990, cols. 1019-1021. 
46 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, III, nos. 1-13 for all charters pertaining to the found-
ing diet of March 1381. 
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A Swabian Urban League (Schwäbischer Städtebund) of fourteen imperial 
cities had already formed on 14 July 1376 with Ulm serving as the capital 
city where delegates met for an annual diet.47 A leadership council guided 
the league between diets, and it quickly joined with the newly reconstituted 
Rhenish Urban League on 17 June 1381 to form the South German Urban 
League (Süddeutsche Städtebund). The Swabian Urban League proved to 
be a thorn in the side of regional nobles, as it continued to expand to 
40 cities by 1385 including non-Swabian members such as Nuremberg, 
Regensburg, Augsburg, Basel, and Mühlhausen.48 Though the two leagues 
would remain separate entities they combined their diplomatic and military 
strategies to become a major force in German imperial history in the 1380s, 
even extending their diplomatic reach to an affiliation with the emerging 
Swiss Confederation on 21 February 1385. During their first two years as 
a joint coalition the South German Urban League enjoyed decisive military 
victories against the baron leagues of St. George, St. William, and the Lion’s 
League (Löwenbund or Löwengesellschaft).49 Indeed the league members 
felt themselves collectively secure enough by March 1383 to ignore the 
Nuremberg Landfriede negotiated King Wenceslaus, such that the peace 
association that emerged from Nuremberg became scornfully known as the 
«Nuremberg Lord’s League» (Herrenbund). 
King Wenceslaus finally achieved an uneasy truce between the warring 
parties in Heidelberg on 26 July 1384 (Heidelberger Stallung), yet Rhenish 
Urban League members did not participate in the truce’s renewal in Bad 
Mergentheim (Mergentheimer Stallung) on 5 November 1387. Warfare 
was fatefully renewed when Archbishop Pilgrim II of Salzburg joined the 
Swabian Urban League against Duke Frederick of Swabia, unleashing the 
First South German War of Cities (Städtekreig), into which the Rhenish 
Urban League members were drawn. The Swabian league was decimated 
by Count Eberhard II of Württemberg at the Battle of Döffingen (24 
August 1388), and its cities were gradually occupied and then subjected 
47 Founding cities were Ulm, Konstanz, Überlingen, Ravensburg, Lindau, St. Gall, Wan-
gen, Buchhorn, Reutlingen, Rottweil, Memmingen, Biberach, Isny, and Leutkirch. 
RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, II, no. 596.
48 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, II, no. 671; VISCHER, WILHELM, «Geschichte 
des schwäbischen Städtebundes der Jahre 1376-1389» Forschungen zur deutschen Ge-
schichte 3 (1863), pp. 194-202. 
49 ZILKE, SONJA, «Die Löwen-Gesellschaft, ein Adelsbund des 14. Jahrhunderts», 
Zeitschrift zur Geschichte des Oberrheins 138 (1990), pp. 27-97. The Lion’s League was 
led by the counts of Nassau, Katzenelnbogen, and Wied and had a large membership 
of barons and knights who made the trade routes of the middle and upper Rhine very 
treacherous for merchants and diplomats to travel. 
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to the Landfriede decreed by Wenceslaus at Eger/Cheb (5 March 1389), 
complete with yet again another decree banning urban sworn alliances. 
The Rhenish Urban League was likewise decisively defeated near Worms 
at Pfeddersheim on 6 November 1388 by Count Palatine Ruprecht II 
and followed the others into the Landfriede of 1389. In return for their 
entrance into the imperial peace, Wenceslaus was careful to confirm to the 
cities of both leagues their traditional liberties as imperial and free cities.50 
The great urban leagues of the 1380s were broken for the time being, as 
their huge debts, enforced war reparation payments, and diminution of 
their military capacities resulted in a return into their respective regional 
contexts in order to recover. Yet by 1390 a second Swabian Urban League 
was formed that would continue throughout the fifteenth century, never 
again however reaching the size of the 1380s.51 Only a concerted and massive 
military response by king, princes, and barons succeeded in dismantling 
these two powerful urban leagues. The Rhenish cities and their Swabian 
allies had made clear what capacities these German cities had developed 
for collaborative military intervention. Rhenish cities were no longer only 
economic forces on an aristocratic landscape, they were political and military 
powers whose significance could never again be underestimated. The level 
of administrative, diplomatic, and military coordination alone required in 
the 1380s rivals any medieval aristocratic or imperial campaign, and though 
such interregional leagues ceased to form, the lessons learned here were 
applied in the many continuing regional urban leagues in Alsatia, Swabia, 
Saxony, and other parts of the German empire, not to mention the most 
notable heir to the interregional league tradition: the Swiss Confederation 
(Eidgenossenschaft), whose existence the Luxembourg emperor Charles IV 
had intentionally excluded from the Golden Bull as this suited his anti-
Hapsburg politics. 
50 ENNEN, «Rheinischer Städtebund von 1381», cols. 1019-1021. This particular era of 
regional war put serious pressure on the inner cohesion of the Swabian Urban League, 
which was often expressed by the resistance of individual cities to the central author-
ity of the League’s permanent council in Ulm: Stefanie Rüther, «Der Krieg als Grenzfall 
städtischer “Auβenpolitik”? Zur Institutionalisierung von Kommunikationsprozessen 
im Schwabischen Städtebund (1374-1390)», in JORG, CHRISTIAN and JUCKER, 
MICHAEL, eds., Spezialisierung und Professionalisierung: Träger und Foren städtischer 
Aussenpolitik während des späten Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit [Trierer Beitrage 
zu den Historischen Kulturwissenschaften 1], Trier, 2010, pp. 105-120.
51 BLEZINGER, HARRO, Der Schwäbische Städtebund in den Jahren 1438-1445. Mit einem 
Überblick über seine Entwicklung seit 1389, Stuttgart, 1954.
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BETWEEN THE RHENISH LEAGUES: COLOGNE AND REGIONAL 
URBAN LEAGUES
Now that we have considered at the macro level the evolution of the two 
great interregional urban leagues involving the Rhineland, let us take a close 
look at a regional league on a micro level for more specifics on their origins, 
structures, and outcomes. The two great interregional leagues (Rhenish 
League, Rhenish Urban League) serve as bookends to the many and varied 
regional urban leagues that developed in the century between them. Indeed, 
the regional urban leagues actually outnumbered and outlived the two great 
interregional urban leagues, and so deserve consideration here. We shall look 
to the Rhenish metropolis of Cologne for our example. 
Cologne had been establishing bilateral urban alliances since 1149 when it 
secured a treaty with Trier,52 and among the few surviving charters of such 
agreements there remains a 4 November 1252 charter with Boppard in which 
a protocol for resolving unpaid debts between their citizens was articulated 
in order to limit arrests and litigation before their respective courts.53 Such 
mutual legal protections were a common early form of collaboration between 
Rhineland cities, as were mutual citizenship status between cities.54 After 
driving out the archbishop of Cologne from his cathedral city in 1288 the 
citizens of Cologne needed such regional urban alliances more than ever to 
sustain their autonomy as a free city. Yet such alliances were complicated, 
since other regional cities were still under the lordship of the archbishop of 
Cologne. When Andernach, Bonn, and Koblenz established an urban alliance 
in February 1301 «to avoid conflicts with their neighbors», all three cities 
were still careful to delimit their oaths by reserving the rights of their lord the 
archbishop of Cologne.55 Now these three cities were preparing for conflict 
with their lord the archbishop regarding the exactions at their tolls, and 
yet they were still scrupulous in recognizing that he had legitimate regalian 
rights over those tolls.
Only with royal sanction then was Cologne able to ally itself legally 
with other regional cities against the interests of the archbishop. Such an 
52 HIRSCHMANN, Die Stade im Mittelalter, p. 38.
53 Cologne City Archive, HUA 181; ENNEN, LEONARD, Quellen zur Geschichte der 
Stadt Köln II, Cologne, 1863, no. 310; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 191.
54 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 396: Tilmann of Cologne appears among the 
signatories of the 9 May 1285 alliance between Frankfurt am Main, Wetzlar, and 
Friedberg. He was a citizen of Frankfurt am Main, who also appears as a signatory 
on the 1 December 1285 reissue of the alliance which then included Gelnhausen 
(RUSER, I: no. 398). 
55 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, nos. 196-197; II, no. 3.
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opportunity arose over these very tolls in May of 1301, when the Hapsburg 
king Albert I empowered the cities of Cologne, Koblenz, Andernach, Bonn, 
Neuβ, Bacherach, Lahnstein, Rheinberg, Schmithausen, Mainz, Trier, Worms, 
Speyer, Strasbourg, Basel, and Constance «to establish and swear to a general 
peace» against the unjust tolls, levies, and convoy fees forced on them 
by the elector-prince archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier.56 Not only 
did the king authorize the formation of an urban league against the three 
Rhenish prince-archbishops, he ordered the league «to actively resist with 
impunity the collectors of the tolls and convoy fees» along the Rhine until 
such exactions were returned to their levels in Emperor Frederick II’s reign. 
The Rhenish cities were a critical ally for the king in his struggle with these 
prince-archbishops arrayed against him. 
The conflict over abuses in tolls and fees went favorably for Albert I 
until his assassination on 1 May 1308, and then dragged on into the reign 
of the Wittelsbach king Ludwig IV, whose disputed royal election in October 
1313 had drawn the archbishops of Mainz and Trier as well as King John of 
Bohemia as elector-princes to his side. With their aid he announced on 22 
June 1317 a final settlement of the issue through another Landfriede involving 
the archbishops of Mainz and Trier, King John of Bohemia, various nobles, 
and the citizens of Cologne, Mainz, Worms, Speyer, Aachen, Oppenheim, 
Frankfurt, Friedberg, Gelnhausen, and Wetzlar.57 All tolls beyond traditional 
convoy fees were abandoned by the archbishops of Mainz and Trier, and all 
new tolls from Cologne to Antwerp were also outlawed. Archbishop Henry 
II of Cologne, however, as a partisan elector of King Ludwig’s Hapsburg 
cousin and anti-king Frederick «the Fair» of Austria, had not entered into 
this peace agreement. But Ludwig stipulated that should he choose to join 
he could retain a portion of his traditional regalian toll income within his 
principality during the term of the Landfriede (i.e. six of the twenty-two 
gros Tournois58 per cartload of wine, with the remaining sixteen going to the 
king) but if not this income would be cut off as an inducement to joining 
the peace. The Landfriede remained in force for seven years, during which 
56 Cologne City Archive, HUA 671; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 286; 
SCHWALM, JACOB, MGH Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum (1298-
1313), Hanover, 1906, reprint 1981, no. 134.
57 Cologne City Archive, HUA 878-879; SCHWALM, JACOB, Constitutiones et acta pu-
blica imperatorum et regum (1313-1324), Hanover, 1909, reprint 1981, no. 421.
58 The gros Tournois, or Tours Groschen, was one of the first French «great coins» or 
thick silver coins, valued at about 10-12 pennies (denarii) and thus roughly compa-
rable to a shilling (solidus): SPUFFORD, PETER, Money and its use in medieval Europe, 
Cambridge, 1988, p. 299. Archbishop Henry II of Cologne had Grosspfennig coins 
minted in Bonn. 
Urban Diplomacy: Cologne, the Rhenish League (1254-1257) and the Rhenish Urban ...
ANALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE. HISTORIA MEDIEVAL, N.º 19,
(2015-2016) (pp. 193-219) I.S.S.N.: 0212-2480
213
time no toll rates could be raised. The citizens of Cologne were also given 
instructions to «help with at least four people [as representatives to the 
alliance], as had been agreed upon in their previous alliance with the lords 
of 5 June 1288» This reference to the earlier Battle of Worringen, where 
a coalition of regional counts and nobles had joined Cologne to rout the 
archbishop of Cologne’s army, was a powerful allusion for Archbishop Henry 
II, because he himself had fought as a youth in the Battle of Worringen 
alongside his father Count Henry II of Virneburg and brother Ruprecht 
-- ironically for the Cologne coalition against Siegfried of Westerburg, then 
archbishop of Cologne. On the next day, the king along with the archbishops 
of Mainz and Trier and the king of Bohemia (pro-Wittelsbach elector-princes 
all) clarified the stipulations concerning regalian toll incomes: of twenty-
two gros Tournois, the king’s share should be garnered thus: seven should be 
raised at the Koblenz toll, and nine at the Remagen toll. If the archbishop 
of Cologne upheld the peace he should receive the remaining six, three 
from the Andernach toll and three from the Bonn toll. But if the archbishop 
refused, then the king would receive only three from Koblenz and three from 
Remagen, with the remaining sixteen placed into the Landfriede war fund 
against the archbishop.59 
The city councilmen of Cologne went straight to work implementing these 
stipulations, as a letter to them from their counterparts in Speyer makes clear.60 
The latter informed them that they had sent their citizen, Henry of Regensburg, 
to Cologne as the toll supervisor, to whom the Cologners should give a key for 
the money chest. The Speyer councilmen assured them that Henry had already 
taken an oath to them and to the officials of Mainz and Worms as well to collect 
the toll justly. In return, the Cologne councilmen were admonished to take the 
same oath before their own city council as well before the representatives of 
Mainz, Worms, and Speyer. This letter suggests a well-organized, collaborative 
financial, diplomatic, and communication system emerging in support of the 
Landfriede league, complete with funding for the peace-keeping effort and 
documented communication between urban chanceries. 
Under such mounting pressure, on 9 July 1317 Archbishop Henry II of 
Cologne came half way into the Landfriede, opting to join but reserving the 
rights of (and thus his loyalty to) King Frederick.61 Archbishop Henry II 
had in fact not only cast his electoral vote for Frederick, but also crowned 
59 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 289. 
60 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 291.
61 SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum (1313-1324), 
Hanover, 1909, reprint 1981, no. 435.
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him in the Bonn Minster on 25 November 1314. Thus preparations for war 
with the archbishop of Cologne continued apace. Surviving correspondence 
indicates that Cologne, Mainz, Worms, and Speyer did indeed elect four 
officials each with a treasury chest key to coordinate the war finances of 
the league, and the chest was only to be opened with the permission of 
all the financial magistrates of each city.62 All parties were kept apprized 
concerning any changes to the status of the elected financial magistrates 
through letters patent, as when Speyer notified the masters, councilmen and 
citizens of Cologne that Henry of Regensburg had fallen ill in October 1317 
and Hermann of Brussels (another Speyer citizen) had been deputized in his 
place as toll collector,63 and then two months later that their citizen Fritz had 
now been deputized «to collect the wages for the soldiers from the toll funds 
at Cologne, according to the treaty with the city of Bacharach».64 
Archbishop Henry II of Cologne also received countervailing pressure 
from his chosen monarch to respond with force against the Landfriede in 
the Rhineland. On 10 February 1318 Frederick issued a letter to Henry 
II, telling him that the king had just received word while in Austria that 
«certain communities of quite a few cities on the Rhine made a reprehensible 
alliance» and with a false pretense of upholding a Landfriede they deceitfully 
established new tolls at Cologne, Koblenz, and Remagen, even making the 
clergy pay and asking everyone to pay more than was formerly done. Frederick 
then castigated the archbishop for agreeing to abandon his tolls at Andernach 
and Bonn and entering into the seven-year peace himself. Therefore the king 
ordered the archbishop to restore his tolls and with the support of his vassals 
to «punish all those with high treason who rebel against this». Though 
Frederick made clear that he was unable to intervene himself, he authorized 
the archbishop to fight to maintain the king’s regalian prerogatives in the 
Rhineland.65 Henry II was now in an untenable position: he either defied his 
monarch as a traitor or became a breaker of the peace which he had sworn 
to uphold, both of which were equally felonious offenses.
62 Cologne City Archive, HUA 894 dated 1 August 1317; RUSER, Die Urkunden und 
Akten, I, no. 292; SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-1324), no. 438. In this let-
ter the civic leaders and citizens of Mainz swear that they would protect securely the 
toll funds gathered at Koblenz and for that purpose elected four men from their city 
council each with a key for the money chest, which they should only open with the 
other cities’ collective approval, “and only for the benefit of the general peace.”
63 Cologne City Archive, HUA 901 dated 19 October 1317; SCHWALM, MGH Constitu-
tiones (1313-1324), no. 463.
64 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 294.
65 RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 295; SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-
1324), no. 472.
Urban Diplomacy: Cologne, the Rhenish League (1254-1257) and the Rhenish Urban ...
ANALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE. HISTORIA MEDIEVAL, N.º 19,
(2015-2016) (pp. 193-219) I.S.S.N.: 0212-2480
215
The archbishop chose to support his king, and thus proceedings began 
against the him as a peace breaker at an alliance meeting in Oppenheim on 
2 April 1318, at which the Cologne citizen John of Bayen made the case for 
action on behalf of Archbishop Baldwin of Trier, Count Gerhard of Jülich, 
and the city council of Cologne before representatives of Mainz, Worms, 
Speyer, Oppenheim, Frankfurt, Wetzlar, Friedberg, and Gelnhausen. After 
exhorting all parties to hold to the founding Landfriede charter of Bacherach, 
the Cologne-Jülich-Trier group formally charged the archbishop of Cologne 
with raising illegal tolls, robbing, and even imprisoning merchants. In 
particular the archbishop of Trier declared that, losing 20,000 pounds of 
pennies per annum from tolls to the peace fund, he would deny any further 
funding from the toll of Koblenz should the remaining cities chose not to go 
to war. Furthermore, the Cologne city council openly declared its readiness 
to take the field of battle, with John of Bayen promising that complaints from 
some cities about the Cologne representatives use of toll funds (no doubt to 
prepare for war) without their permission would be duly addressed at the 
next meeting of alliance representatives. 
Finally, the audience was assured that Count William of Hainault, (the 
alliance’s chosen Landfriede military chief), Count Gerhard of Jülich, and the 
city of Cologne had repeatedly admonished the archbishop of Cologne to 
uphold the peace yet received no response from him. Thus the time had come 
to issue the final warning to the archbishop since the season for campaigning 
was upon them all.66 Clearly the city council of Cologne took the lead in 
persuading the alliance cities to move militarily against the archbishop of 
Cologne, as they were feeling the pressure of his peace-breaking actions 
more than their allies. A targeted and limited military response was quickly 
approved, as on 4 May 1318 Count William of Hainault issued a letter 
confirming that the citizens of Cologne had, at the command of his own 
brother John, besieged the archbishop of Cologne’s town and castle at Brühl, 
from whence the Landfriede had often been broken.67 
The Cologne-Jülich-Sponheim-Hainault coalition army quickly captured 
Brühl, and given the presence of Cologne patricians Gerhard Overstolz, 
Gottschalk Overstolz, and Gotthart Hardevust as signatories on the subsequent 
formal letter of cause (Anlassbrief) against Archbishop Henry II, the traditional 
social elites of Cologne had closed ranks with the city councilmen of the 
66 Cologne City Archive, HUA 922; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 296; 
SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-1324), nos. 488-489.
67 Cologne City Archive, HUA 924; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 297; 
SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-1324), no. 490.
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parishes. The Overstolz and Hardevust scabini issued this formal letter on 17 
June 1318 along with Count John of Sponheim and vassals of Count Gerhard 
of Jülich on behalf of Cologne, the count of Jülich, and their Landfriede allies 
(Eidgenossen) to Archbishop Peter of Mainz, Archbishop Baldwin of Trier, and 
Grand Master Karl of the Teutonic Knights, calling on these recipients to pass 
judgment on the charges against the archbishop of Cologne before Christmas 
eve of 1318, to force the archbishop of Cologne to uphold the peace, and to 
take possession of the town and castle of Brühl as surety until they should 
render judgment. Thus the formal process for mediation was begun as the 
two archbishops and grand master officially confirmed their acceptance of the 
role of mediators (Schiedsleute) in the case before them.68 Their swift reply 
on the same day only declared that clergy belonging to the city of Cologne 
and thus under the Landfriede should retain their freedoms and incomes. Yet 
they refused to adjudicate the charges of peace-breaking by the archbishop.69
While settling ecclesiastical matters, this decision hardly provided a 
means to resolve the outstanding moral and political grievances. So an appeal 
drew out the case to the deadline of Christmas eve of 1318,70 at which 
the mediators rendered a fuller decision.71 All supporters of the archbishop 
imprisoned in Brühl castle were to be released, all clerics reinstated to their 
status before the war and any alliances they joined were to be abandoned; 
the archbishop and his allies were to uphold the Landfriede according to 
its charters and give back all seized goods; both parties were to confirm in 
writing their willingness to let the archbishop of Trier hold the town and 
castle of Brühl until the case was finally settled, and the archbishop was 
to have his cities of Bonn, Andernach, and Neuβ confirm in writing that 
they would not assist him in future should he fail to hold to this decision. 
The mediators still refused, however, to adjudicate cases regarding either 
plunder and arson committed in open battle or the sensitive issue of the 
Rhine tolls. The matter of tolls proved very difficult to resolve as royal 
68 Cologne City Archive, HUA 926-927; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 298; 
SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-1324), no. 491.
69 Cologne City Archive, HUA 929; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 299; 
SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-1324), no. 492.
70 On 19 June 1318 Count William of Hainault wrote to inform the allies (the magis-
trates of Cologne primary among them) concerning their league’s «holy peace» that he 
had to resign the office of Landfriede military chief, given the burden of wars closer to 
home. He continued, however, to uphold the peace as an ally: Cologne City Archive, 
HUA 930; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 31; SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones 
(1313-1324), no. 494. 
71 Cologne City Archive, HUA 949; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, I, no. 302; 
SCHWALM, MGH Constitutiones (1313-1324), no. 519.
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regalia rights were claimed by rival kings (the Wittelsbach Ludwig IV and 
the Hapsburg Frederick of Austria). Thus the key element in any mediated 
reconciliation of feuding parties, reparations for damages, went unaddressed 
by this tribunal. It would take another twenty months of further negotiations 
with new mediators to reconcile these outstanding issues.
For this purpose both Archbishop Henry II and the Cologne city officials 
agreed on Count Gerhard of Jülich (who proved an able arbitrator despite 
his participation in the capture of Brühl) and John of Kuik, the provost 
of St. Servatius in Maastricht, as the mediators. In a decision acceptable 
to both sides was announced on 15 August 132072 by the count. John of 
Kuik had arranged for an ecclesiastical court of arbitration under Emico 
of Sponheim (a member of the Cologne cathedral chapter) to settle within 
three months all matters affecting prelates and clerics either appointed to 
offices in Cologne or who left the city in support of the archbishop during 
the war, with the cathedral provost settling any appeals that could not be 
reconciled by then. The count of Jülich reconciled the archbishop with 
the citizens of Cologne, whereby all prisoners were freed and the sticky 
issue of tolls was resolved. The archbishop was allowed to collect fourteen 
gros Tournois for each cartload of wine, but only at the tolls of Bonn and 
Andernach, from which he would pay three from the Bonn toll and one 
from Andernach until all his reparation debts to Cologne citizens were paid 
in full. He also abandoned all other illegal tolls and transit fees and agreed 
to uphold the peace until its expiration on 24 June 1324, issuing letters 
patent to this effect and ordering his own brother Ruprecht of Virneburg, the 
provosts of Bonn, Tomberg, Kerpen, and Theonburg, and all his magistrates 
to do likewise. A protocol was also established to adjudicate any future 
conflicts between city and archbishop: if a merchant or someone else passing 
through the archbishop’s land were robbed, imprisoned, wounded, or killed 
the aggrieved party or the citizens of Cologne (on his/her behalf) should 
complain directly to the archbishop, who or whose magistrates must judge 
the case and indemnify within four weeks. If the archbishop was not in 
the land, the case should be brought to the burgrave of Brühl. Should any 
magistrate refuse to cooperate he was to be deposed as a perjurer and his 
own goods were seized to indemnify the aggrieved party. Quite remarkably, 
to assure that the archbishop and his magistrates observed this agreement, 
the castle and town of Brühl was given to the city of Cologne as security 
for the remainder of the Landfriede and assigned to the knight Kuno of 
72 Cologne City Archive, Urkunden Kopiar 1, folio 75; LACOMBLET, THEODOR JO-
SEPH, Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins, III, Düsseldorf, 1853, no. 180.
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Vieschenich as burgrave, who would remain in office until all outstanding 
claims were settled, even if this went past the 27 June 1324 expiration date of 
the Landfriede.73 Should archbishop or his magistrates again break the peace, 
the burgrave would open the castle and town to the citizens of Cologne. 
Finally, the irreconcilable issue of divided allegiances to monarchs was 
handled deftly. The archbishop of Cologne was allowed to «serve and help the 
Duke of Austria, whom he recognizes as king», while the count of Jülich and 
the citizens of Cologne served and helped «their lord, King Ludwig,» with 
both sides allowed to contribute funds to their respective lords as service. 
Most importantly, this clause was added to maintain the regional peace: 
«If these lords come into the land, everyone on both sides should defend 
themselves and not enter into war against or damage each other». Finally, the 
delicate equilibrium existing before the outbreak of hostilities was reinstated: 
the regalia rights of courts, lordship, and properties were confirmed to the 
archbishop, while the citizens of Cologne were promised the right to «remain 
in their peace and customs». The final admonition brought the peace-making 
process to a close: «Both parties should be completely reconciled». 
This peace held for a time, as evidenced by Archbishop Henry II’s 
presence in the city of Cologne to consecrate the new cathedral’s high choir 
on 27 September 1322. But in 1359 another Cologne-led regional urban 
alliance formed, this time including Bonn, Andernach, Koblenz, to forcibly 
prevent a later archbishop of Cologne (William of Gennep) from building a 
new fortress at Rolandswerth (just south of Bonn) in order to dominate the 
middle Rhine valley.74 Cologne promised a contingent of 2,500-3,000 armed 
soldiers and 100 archers delivered by ship to destroy the new castle, leading 
the archbishop to abandon the venture. The net result was the formation of 
a ten-year «union and friendship» league founded on 7 September 1359 by 
Cologne, Bonn, Koblenz, Andernach, and Oberwesel, which secured not only 
a military alliance against the archbishop of Cologne, but also established 
protocols for legal equality and justice, the banning of debt imprisonment, 
provision of mutual aid and conflict arbitration for all the citizens of these 
cities, alongside a collective diplomatic policy toward those outside of the 
league. As evidence of the remarkable level of collective allegiance and 
collaboration achieved by urban leagues of the mid-fourteenth century, this 
regional Rhenish league appointed four jurors from each city to handle its 
affairs, all of whom swore «to uphold all the pertaining articles in this letter 
73 ENNEN, LEONARD, Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln, IV, Cologne, 1870, no. 89.
74 Cologne City Archive, HUA 2256-2257; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, II, nos. 519-
520; ENNEN, Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln, IV, nos. 404-405.
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[of alliance] and also not to depart from them in mortal danger and even 
when matters go against their city, relatives, or friends».75 By this point in 
time the Rhenish cities had developed a very sophisticated network of well-
trained emissaries and messengers who maintained close communication 
between them, and this in turn cultivated a maturing diplomatic culture 
and information systems that rivaled anything seen at royal and aristocratic 
courts.76 And though they were never fixed entities but rather ever evolving 
amalgamations of a myriad of different sorts of urban communities, they 
still provided an trans-urban venue for experimenting with collective self-
government and self-help.77 
Medieval bourgeois aspirations for urban autonomy did not stop at the city 
walls, and civic life existed between these walls as well as within them. The 
Rhenish urban leagues, both regional and interregional, reveal a significant scope 
and sophistication of administrative, diplomatic, communication, financial, 
and military integration that reach well beyond traditional historiographies 
on trade routes and commercial development. Indeed, these mutual self-help 
alliances contributed to medieval political culture by enabling the development 
of a distinctive inter-urban diplomatic culture, which inculcated in their 
bourgeois leaders the practice of thinking beyond their own city’s private 
interests and toward the collective good of a much larger regional or inter-
regional community -- indeed, sometimes even of the Empire as a whole. 
Rhenish urban alliances therefore ought to be included with town councils, 
executive officers, and municipal constitutions in any account of European 
political culture, constitutional development, territorial government, and 
conflict resolution during the central and later Middle Ages. 
75 Cologne City Archive, HUA 2263-2264; RUSER, Die Urkunden und Akten, II, pp. 
530-533, nos. 521-522; ENNEN, Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln, IV, no. 409; 
LACOMBLET, Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins, III, no. 595.
76 The greatest challenge in this emerging urban diplomatic culture was the varying 
degrees of authority given by cities to their emissaries, which often made for 
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